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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The wide lens 
Recent debates on how companies push innovations have focused on opportunity scanning and 
control issues in so-called innovation ecosystems (Nambisan and Baron, 2012): innovation 
ecosystems are conceivable as ecologies formed by organizations and individuals that co-evolve 
through organizational learning and create new forms of value creation and appropriation by 
aligning investments (Williamson, De Meyer, 2012). 
The theoretical basis of ecosystems date back to the work of Moore (1996) that points to the 
importance of collaboration as an overarching dynamic characterizing these ecologies; but whereas 
Moore’s work is mostly focused on the organizing principles of ecosystems and on the general 
presumption that ecosystems can pop up in the economy from scratch (p. 106-136), little is known 
about their path-dependent dynamics of emergence into a complex, global and connected world1: do 
they emerge naturally or are the result of purposeful action driven by companies? In the latter case, 
what kind of organizational action is suitable and to what extent? Is there an array of collaborative 
practices and governance forms that firms are able to put place in such respect? Are ecosystems of 
innovation just a rhetorical formula or a novel form for organizing value networks and industries? 
 
Two streams of research have been particularly vibrant in trying to elucidate either theoretically or 
empirically the scientific rigorousness of innovation or business ecosystems: in the strategy 
                                                          
1 Also, the biological origins of the term and its etymology (eco- from the Greek word “oikos”, i.e. home/family, and –
system from sun, i.e. together, and stema, i.e. to stand) makes it an allusive rhetoric tool that inspires hopeful gathering 
between different species of life. 
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literature, Adner (2006) has pointed to the need of aligning a company’s innovation strategy with 
the array of entities composed by the product complementors and suppliers: indeed, when 
innovative products need to be complemented by supporting elements, the challenge for the focal 
firm goes beyond the traditional risks associated to innovative projects to include also the 
coordination of interdependencies and the risks associated to the integration of different parts of the 
value chain that are not under the focal firm’s control (p. 2-3). Adner’s caveat to companies is to 
consider cautiously the risks associated to innovation ecosystems: they must make sure that all 
partners are on time in delivering their offerings and this suggests a modest though realistic 
consideration of the orchestrating abilities of the focal firm (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Firms can 
have more returns in delaying product development and let other players catch up (Adner, 2006), so 
to “bypass the risks of entering large markets by offering a simpler product to a smaller market 
(2006: 3)”. 
The resulting uncertainty must therefore be assessed through a “wide lens” that permits to scan and 
monitor the whole picture of supporting elements (Adner, 2012), thus shifting the rationales for 
value co-creation from bilateral exchanges (Brandeburger and Stuart, 1996) to the level of industry 
architecture (Jacobides, Knudsen, Augier, 2006). Following Adner’s conceptualization Kapoor has 
noted that the construct has been used “as a way to make interdependencies more explicit” (Adner 
and Kapoor, 2010) and in approaches aimed to “understand the coordination among partners in 
exchange networks that are characterized by simultaneous cooperation and competition 
(Brandeburger and Nalebuff, 1996)”. He studied extensively the challenges related to the 
management of interdependencies in the semiconductor industry (Adner and Kapoor, 2010) and 
distinguished between components (upstream or supplier firms) and complements (downstream or 
complementors) (p. 309). 
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Figure 1. Generic schema of an ecosystem (from Adner and Kapoor, 2010) 
On the other side, the ecosystem construct is much in debt with the platform strategy literature 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008), where the ecosystem is conceived as 
an intermediate ecology between the supply chain and the industry: therefore, at a broader level in 
respect to how Adner and Kapoor depict them and closer to a network form of organizing. The 
platform is a “shared set of core technologies and tech standards underlying an organizational field 
that support value co-creation through specialization and complementary offerings (Thomas, Autio, 
Gann, 2014).” Indeed, in their recent literature review on platforms and architectural advantage, 
Thomas et al. (2014) have stressed the sub-division of the platform studies in four streams: 
platforms can refer to different layers of organizational focus: the internal transfer platform, the 
supply chain platform, the 2-sided markets platform and the platform-as-ecosystem. For each layer 
there is a different logic of value generation: 
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- in the internal transfer the platform is used to coordinate the transactions internalized within the 
organization; the platform is devoted to control the internal transfer of exchanges in a logic of 
minimization of the costs of transaction (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985); 
- in the supply chain platform the logic is the optimization of the economies of scale and scope and 
the platform serves to organize the array of external actors composing the firm’s supply chain; 
- in the 2-sided markets platform the logic is to govern the economies of complementarity that 
characterize 2-sided or multi-sided markets (Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2006) and such 
loose orientation is connected to the flexibility required to drive economies of innovation; 
- the platform-as-ecosystem: the more external orientation of platforms is connected to ecosystems 
and the authors underline that research on this platform conceptualization stresses the possibility for 
platforms to take advantage of all three previous logics of value creation, i.e. transaction, production 
and innovation. 
As depicted in Figure 2 taken from  Thomas et al. (2014), the platform-as-ecosystem is at the center 
of the different layers: the fact that it’s at the center must not be equivocated, because the sense of 
the model is to stress the fact that studies of platform-as-ecosystems contain also elements of the 
different and more internally focused systems of relations and exchanges. 
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Figure 2. Architectural leverage and platform-as-ecosystem (Thomas, Autio, Gann, 2014) 
 
Thus, the model resulting from this study solves many of the contradictory uses of the ecosystem 
construct that afflicted studies on the topic. Thomas et al. focus their assessment of the ecosystem 
construct on the issue of control of the interdependencies more explicitly, although for them what 
makes ecosystems especially puzzling is the combination of many different and contrasting logics: 
indeed, studies on ecosystems include elements of product families’ platforms such as architectural 
design, interfaces and modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) and elements of platforms that 
conceive the platform as a hub of exchange for two- or multi-sided markets (Eisenmann, Parker and 
Van Alstyne, 2006). How the combination of these different logics within the same strategy is 
conceptualized? Thomas et al. (2014) underline the possibility to “cumulate” them in a strategy of 
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architectural advantage: this means that the possibility to obtain disproportionate returns, given by 
economies of scale/scope, economies of complementarity or manipulation of pricing in market 
intermediation, is strongly associated to the level of openness of the architecture that ultimately 
defines what is the external horizon of the platform strategy and who are the external actors 
involved. 
The issue of openness and knowledge 
Paradoxically, openness means involvement of third parties and disaggregation of the value chain 
that becomes structured in a way different from how it used to be conceived previously by industry 
players: therefore, the emphasis on collaboration and openness that is normally associated to 
ecosystems obscures the cold fact that concerns over control and knowledge appropriation are at the 
heart of the hurdles experienced by ecosystem participants. This becomes particularly problematic 
in knowledge-based industries where the control of the intellectual property generated is crucial and 
the pace of technological innovation particularly high by definition. Indeed, Leten, Vanhaverbeke, 
Roijakkers, Clerix and Van Helleputte’s work (2013) on the mechanisms of knowledge control and 
appropriation in the nanotechnology field has pointed to the fundamental role of the Intellectual 
Property model in determining and guiding the logics of value co-creation and appropriation in 
multi-party settings: through Industry affiliation programs the IMEC research center induces 
collaboration from partners but its novel feature is constituted by the management of the foreground 
Intellectual Property that is generated during the program: thanks to an ex-ante bilateral agreement 
between the participant and the research center, the foreground knowledge is identified and 
distinguished from the background knowledge, whose ownership is not associated to increasing 
returns (p. 56, Leten et al., 2013); during the program, part of the knowledge generated is retained 
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by the center in order to become background and, once the affiliation program is concluded, made 
available to the whole ecosystem of partners of IMEC (p. 56, Leten et al., 2013). 
Two theoretical implications arise from the dynamics of collaboration harnessed by the IP model: 
first, the catalyzing object in ecosystems is likely to be the manipulation and refinement of 
knowledge in a broad sense, so that the knowledge can be embodied in technological artifacts but 
can be also relational or contextual knowledge; second, although the IP model is highly informative 
on how to regulate appropriation concerns, the IMEC research center basically advocates 
redistribution in the ecosystem from a semi-regulator stance, therefore embodying the public 
interest for an industry or field of knowledge to activate initiatives of value co-creation and 
appropriation. Little is known about the operations of a private entity claiming such leadership from 
a self-interested position and the possible options: the basic motivation of this work is that many 
insights can be explored when a focal firm relinquishes control over an established chain of 
suppliers and complementors. Such operation is called in managerial jargon “opening up the 
ecosystem” and underlines the willingness of the focal firm to modify its strategy toward a 
platform-oriented one. Why should a firm open up its precious stock of partners? For open 
innovation theorists this can be a wise strategy if the knowledge made available can be 
complemented externally in order to ensure value co-creation; very often this is done because the 
firm has found itself trapped in an industry bottleneck where the price to pay for the high 
commoditization of the offering is particularly severe. 
To sum up, the sharing of the knowledge created is often the unique way to generate momentum at 
the system level, that must be “opened up” with a strong emphasis on exploration of novel issues 
rather than operational ones. In exploration, activities are inherently inefficient (March, 1962) and 
12 
 
 
 
control rests on sociological and institutional devices rather than property rights (Thomas et al., 
2014).  
The hurdles related to learning and the management of the knowledge created in inter-
organizational projects of value co-creation led to consider the following research questions: what 
are the micro-dynamics of collaboration when the boundary between the collective goal and the 
individual interest is fuzzy and ill-defined? We try to clarify theoretically this research question by 
investigating empirically the individual and group level dynamics that characterize projects of 
collaboration for value co-creation. Also, what are the connecting practices performed by 
participants? In considering such practices, we try to understand how much these can be used as 
paths for value co-creation and what type of knowledge is eventually recombined. Finally, how and 
what type of order emerge? In tackling a more structural puzzle on ecosystems of innovation, we try 
to develop a framework that can integrate the micro-dynamics investigated and the connecting 
practices with the whole industrial and technological fields of reference of the present research. The 
potential contribution of the findings rests on building theory of strategy making at the 
interorganizational level: following Burgelman’s work and the extensive corpus of knowledge on 
intra-corporate venturing the present work adapts the strategic initiative construct to an 
interorganizational, though collaborative, setting. 
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Logic of the research and structure of the thesis 
Therefore, the problematic we stress is somewhat antecedent to Adner’s caveat on time of  entrance 
described at the beginning of the chapter: our concern is directed to understand what are the micro-
dynamics characterizing the convergence of value co-creators at the ecosystem level and what are 
the practices used to coordinate and control their actions. 
We think that to understand such dynamics is necessary not only the consideration of Adner’s 
caveat cited at the beginning of the chapter but also to scrutinize the activities of would-be partners 
from an episode that constitutes a potential inception of an “open ecosystem” strategy: by inception 
we mean one or more episodes that are able to attract the interests of different parties toward a 
market opportunity. In this sense we are not excluding its eventual path-dependent or serendipitous 
origin nor the possibility that the object around which the interests gravitate is simply an idea or the 
outcome of many years of work in the lab, eventually retrieved and put in the marketplace (Cattani, 
2006): instead, and questioning Moore’s conceptual basis of ecosystems popping up from nowhere, 
we consider both the voluntary side of such strategy and its co-evolutionary origin at the industrial 
level. 
From a theoretical point of view, the stream of research mostly pointing to a potential co-existence 
of autonomous and induced behavior in processes of change is related to the work of strategy 
making scholars (Burgelman, 1983, 1991, Noda and Bower, 1996, Floyd and Lane, 2000, Lovas 
and Ghoshal, 2000, Canales, 2015). A central tenet of this stream is that the strategy process is 
enacted to link the organizational action to the environment through a combination of autonomous 
and induced behavior (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985): the outcomes of the strategy process will 
either be routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), in which inertial activities are seen as driving forces 
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of action, and capabilities, which emphasize the learning and forward-looking drivers of action 
(Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). Capabilities are the resources mostly apt to typify selection, 
especially when “dynamic” (Teece et al., 1997, Winter, 2003), and determine strategic renewal, that 
is “mindful” or conscious adaptation (Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000). However, challenging 
Burgelman’s skepticism over the ability of inertial forces to act as a source of renewal, this stream 
of research has underlined the co-existence of autonomous and induced behavior within the same 
strategy process, as suggested by Mintzberg and Waters (1985). Organizational renewal is therefore 
seen as an alignment of the organization with the environment and its demands, occurring through 
successive convergent iterations towards a complementarity of stability and change (Burgelman, 
1996; Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000; Nelson and Winter, 1982, Noda and Bower, 1996). A second 
tenet of the strategy making stream is the concept of strategic intent, that is the wish or 
organizational goal set up and formulated by top management and towards which the organizational 
action is planned and enacted for, with the intervening role of the strategy making process enlarging 
the view of the analysis to comprehend both planning and execution. As found by Lovas and 
Ghoshal (2000) and Canales (2015), the strategic intent “constitutes a selection mechanism and the 
selection operated feeds back validity to the strategic intent (Canales, 2015, p. 4-5).” Finally, a 
construct parallel but different from the concept of strategic intent identified by strategy process 
scholars is the so-called organizing principle: this is seen as the ex-post rationalization of the 
selection mechanism that makes the members of the organization capable to express explicitly 
“what do we do, as an organization”. 
At inception of co-creation projects, and differently from space of interaction where different fields 
and different kinds of knowledge have an encounter such as “Interstitial spaces” (Furnari, 2013), 
private parties’ interests over the object are competing and kept behind the scenes: what’s on stage 
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is the fact that different interests are gravitating around the same issue/opportunity. Once the 
interests holders decide to collaborate a minimal agreement between the parties determines the 
onset of an umbrella strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). We expect a loose though minimal 
structure of relations and governance stemming from the agreement which will be likely to focus on 
the “meeting of multiple demands simultaneously” (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989) in the making. 
Indeed, as suggested by the work of Wareham, Fox and Cano Giner (2014), one of the most 
intriguing features of ecosystems is the potential orchestration of different partners under the same 
strategic intent: orchestration means “activation” of performers and this is usually done by turning 
latent issues salient and worth of attention (Ocasio, 1997). At the same time, we expect the 
agreement to act literally like an umbrella in order to bound a space for collaboration and shield it 
from environmental erosion such as inter-organizational distrust and fierce competition. 
We hypothesize that within an umbrella strategy actors’ initiatives can be particularly disconnected 
one with the other because flourishing from private interests highly heterogeneous (these are the 
blue arrows in the figure below); at the same time, they are apparently converging around one or 
more issue: as a result, they can conceptualized within the boundaries of an umbrella strategy (the 
black lines containing the flow of unconnected strategies). 
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Figure 3. The flow of strategy making (adapted from Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) 
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A third element is given by the environment that imposes on an evolutionary basis modifications to 
the boundaries of the umbrella, either expanding or restricting the opportunity space created by the 
umbrella (these are the red lines touching the black boundaries of the umbrella).  
In this part of the work the aim is to understand what influences the organizing principle in order 
build theory on the strategy making literature at the inter-organizational level: the main difference 
with this stream of literature is that the focus of the present work is at the inter-organizational level 
and aimed to understand dynamics of value co-creation at such level, while the traditional focus of 
the strategy making stream is on intra-corporate venturing. Thus, the theoretical and analytical leap 
is done by adding to the existing knowledge of the strategy making literature a model of nested 
interests: this can help us in understanding the genesis of the selection mechanism in inter-
organizational projects of co-creation, the mutation of the organizing principle and the process of 
organizational change entailed. We argue that a drift of the organizing principle may occur not only 
because of the constructive confrontation that usually drives the selection of initiatives but also 
because the knowledge allowing adaptation may be highly heterogeneous; this can lead to a 
balkanized process of learning that fuels the ambiguity over the organizing principle and its 
adaptability to members’ interests. 
In the second part, we ground our reasoning under a co-evolutionary logic of technological 
convergence: indeed, many dynamics of innovation occur through recombination of pre-existing 
knowledge bases that tend to survive processes of vertical disintegration or commodification of 
industries. Therefore, although companies and managers are not inert in the structuration of the task 
environment, engaging an opportunity race may be perceived as necessary only when basic 
assumptions on firm’s organizing principles or ability to survive are challenged by exogenous 
processes of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934). Burgelman and Grove (1996) have referred to 
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that moment of disruption in terms of “strategic inflection point”: this may be related to 
competence-enhancing or competence-destroying technological change but our interest is more on 
the fact that it entails a change in how oneself role is conceived within the evolving inter-
organizational environment. Therefore, the presentation of such co-evolutionary logic is purposed 
to frame through a wider and dynamic perspective the opportunity space in highly unstable fields 
such as the one of Telecommunications where the importance of mediating technologies makes 
network externalities particularly relevant and likely to drive attempts of orchestration of many 
actors at the same time.  
Finally, a model capable to explain the most relevant effect of the dynamics studied is proposed, 
along with a discussion and the implications for each research question posed. In particular, we try 
to develop a model that can explain how the organizing principle in collaborative settings is 
modified, what factors are influential and to what extent the model is valid.  
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CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH   
PART 1 
The alliance inception 
In order to investigate empirically the research questions, I conducted an ethnographic study on the 
early operations of a multi-party and global consortium, set up by 12 companies in September 2012 
and composed by almost 100 organizations in March 2014, called In-Location Alliance2. 
The consortium was initially formed by a group of global and local companies that met to take 
advantage of the advancements of Nokia in technologies for indoor positioning: the building block 
of Nokia’s invitation for collaboration was the possibility for allies to work together on the system 
architecture for indoor positioning with Bluetooth specifications and protocols and harmonize it 
with Wi-fi protocols; concurrently, part of the agreement was based on the wish to set up a pilot 
program for members and promotion efforts to increase market adoption at an industrial level of the 
potential services enabled. The system architecture for indoor positioning is a system of 
specifications and interfaces between different components of the system, it can be represented in 
the different modules composing it and in the connections between such modules. In the context of 
the ILA, it was particularly important to work on the architecture of the system in order to ensure 
interoperability among partners and the market players eventually interested to embark in the 
project. The modification towards an interoperable system of specifications was hypothesized to be 
sourced openly and in a democratic way, i.e. each member of the ecosystem composing the alliance 
was supposed to have requirements to propose for insertion in the architecture. Once the 
                                                          
2 From here forward ILA 
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modifications were assessed, they would be proposed to a standardization body in order to grant 
interoperability and foster the adoption of the technology. 
Most part of the allies were semiconductor firms, handset manufacturers and telecom carriers: their 
industrial positions were resembling the basic vertical structure of a potential offering for indoor 
positioning but two requisites for such goal were necessary: first, the work on the system 
architecture had to be done in order to accomplish the desired harmonization of Bluetooth and Wi-fi 
technologies; second, the assessment of the industrial landscape not only in terms of members’ roles 
in the downstream or upstream part of the value chain but also in terms of the market connections 
that could be established: most of the partners were former complementors or spin-offs of Nokia 
and Nokia itself was not present as a device maker but with a division specifically focusing on 
indoor maps (Nokia Here) and a spin-off (Quuppa) specialized in cups for positioning. The 
complete list of partners taking part to the whole project is enlisted in the table below with 
information on the country of the headquarter, the areas served, the age in years and the size 
measured according to the number of employees. 
Table 1. List of ILA companies (name, country, areas served, age, employees) 
COMPANY HEADQUARTER 
COUNTRY 
AREAS SERVED AGE 
(years) 
EMPLOYEES 
(nr.) 
ACCENTURE UK LTD UK WORLDWIDE 26 319000 
ACTION-E-MACHINES OY FINLAND NATIONAL 10 NA 
ACTIVELIFEVILLAGE FINLAND NATIONAL 7 NA 
AGAIDI OY FINLAND NATIONAL 5 NA 
AIRPORT LIFE USA NATIONAL 3 1 
AISLE411 USA NA  7 NA 
ARUBA NETWORKS USA USA/ASIA/EMEA 13 1200 
ATANDT LABS, NETWORK 
TECHNOLOGIES 
USA NATIONAL 32 243000 
BARNES AND NOBLE - NOOK MEDIA USA NATIONAL 3 NA 
BEIJING MOBISTONE INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
CHINA NA NA NA 
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COMPANY HEADQUARTER 
COUNTRY 
AREAS SERVED AGE 
(years) 
EMPLOYEES 
(nr.) 
BEIJING WOASIST 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
CHINA NATIONAL 8 NA 
BYTELIGHT INC.  USA NATIONAL 4 NA 
CELIZION INC. SOUTH KOREA NATIONAL 13 NA 
CENTIGON SOLUTIONS USA NATIONAL 8 NA 
CISCO SYSTEMS USA WORLDWIDE 31 74000 
COMBAIN MOBILE AB SWEDEN NA 6 NA 
CONVERGE LABS LLC INDIA NATIONAL NA NA 
CSR PLC UK WORLDWIDE 17 2130 
DECAWAVE LTD IRELAND WORLDWIDE NA NA 
DIALOG SEMICONDUCTOR UK ASIA 34 573 
DIO INTERACTIVE CO. LTD SOUTH KOREA WORLDWIDE 8 50 
EPTISA SPAIN NATIONAL 25 NA 
ERISMA TECHNOLOGIES  SWEDEN NATIONAL 17 50 
ESRI USA WORLDWIDE 46 2700 
FORMOSA WIRELESS 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
TAIWAN ASIA 13 NA 
FRAUNHOFER PORTUGAL 
RESEARCH  
GERMANY WORLDWIDE 66 20000 
GALILEO SATELLITE NAVIGATION 
LTD 
ISRAEL WORLDWIDE 9 NA 
GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. USA WORLDWIDE 26 9200 
GE LIGHTNING USA WORLDWIDE 104 17000 
GENASYS SPAIN EUROPE/AMERICA 15 50 
GEOMOBILE SPAIN EUROPE 6 NA 
GNSS TECHNOLOGIES INC. JAPAN NATIONAL 8 NA 
GPSYSTEMS NETHERLANDS EUROPE 5 3 
GREENWAVE REALITY USA WORLDWIDE 7 200 
HTC CORPORATION TAIWAN WORLDWIDE 18 16900 
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO. CHINA WORLDWIDE 28 150000 
INDOORS GMBH AUSTRIA USA/EUROPE 5 30 
INDRA SPAIN USA/EUROPE 22 35730 
INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ITRI) 
TAIWAN ASIA 42 NA 
INNORANGE FINLAND NATIONAL 1 10 
INSITEO FRANCE EUROPE 6 50 
INTEL USA WORLDWIDE 47 107600 
ISEELOC USA NA 1 8 
IVIU TECHNOLOGIES USA NATIONAL 4 50 
KOREA TRADE NETWORK (KTNET) SOUTH KOREA NATIONAL 26 NA 
LAMBDA:4 ENTWICKLUNGEN GERMANY NATIONAL 11 NA 
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GMBH 
COMPANY HEADQUARTER 
COUNTRY 
AREAS SERVED AGE 
(years) 
EMPLOYEES 
(nr.) 
LG ELECTRONICS (MOBILE 
COMMUNICATION) 
SOUTH KOREA WORLDWIDE 57 82000 
MAPPEDIN CANADA AMERICA 4 19 
MARVELL SEMICONDUCTOR INC. USA WORLDWIDE 20 7500 
MEDIATEK TAIWAN WORLDWIDE 18 7000 
MICROSOFT CORP. USA WORLDWIDE 40 128000 
MOBIWORK USA AMERICA 6 NA 
NAVANU USA NATIONAL 4 10 
NETCLEARANCE SYSTEMS INC.  USA NATIONAL 4 10 
NEXTNAV, LLC USA NATIONAL 8 NA 
NOKIA FINLAND WORLDWIDE 150 61000 
NOMADIC SOLUTIONS FRANCE NATIONAL 12 10 
NORDIC SEMICONDUCTOR NORWAY EUROPE/US 32 185 
NORDIC TECHNOLOGY GROUP SWEDEN NATIONAL NA NA 
NOWON FINLAND WORLDWIDE 1 NA 
PAL ROBOTICS, S.L. SPAIN WORLDWIDE 11 NA 
PALMAP PLUS NA NA NA NA 
PHILIPS NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE 124 121000 
PNI SENSOR CORPORATION USA WORLDWIDE 28 NA 
POINT INSIDE INC. USA WORLDWIDE 6 200 
POLARIS WIRELESS SINGAPORE WORLDWIDE 16 150 
PRIMAX TAIWAN WORLDWIDE 31 2700 
PURPLE FORGE CORP USA NATIONAL 7 50 
QISDA CORP TAIWAN WORLDWIDE 31 9000 
QUALCOMM USA WORLDWIDE 30 26000 
QUUPPA FINLAND EUROPE 3 10 
RED POINT POSITIONING USA WORLDWIDE 1 50 
RNIB UK NATIONAL 62 NA 
RUCKUS WIRELESS USA WORLDWIDE 11 900 
RX NETWORKS CANADA NATIONAL 13 NA 
SAILS TECHNOLOGY TAIWAN NA NA NA 
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS SOUTH KOREA WORLDWIDE 27 326000 
SENSEWHERE UK NATIONAL 6 NA 
SENSOR PLATFORMS USA WORLDWIDE 11 50 
SEOLANE INNOVATION FRANCE NATIONAL 8 NA 
SHOPPER TRAK USA WORLDWIDE 20 NA 
SK TELECOM SOUTH KOREA ASIA 31 21000 
SONY MOBILE JAPAN WORLDWIDE 14 7100 
SPECSEATS USA NATIONAL 22 NA 
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COMPANY HEADQUARTER 
COUNTRY 
AREAS SERVED AGE 
(years) 
EMPLOYEES 
(nr.) 
SPECTRACOM USA WORLDWIDE 43 NA 
SPIRENT UK USA/ASIA/EUROPE 79 1500 
TCL MOBILE LTD CHINA WORLDWIDE 34 50000 
TEAM ACTION ZONE FINLAND NATIONAL NA NA 
TELECOM ITALIA ITALY EUROPE/SOUTH 
AMERICA 
21 65000 
TELECOMMUNICATION 
METROLOGY CENTER OF MIIT 
CHINA NATIONAL 55 1200 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS USA WORLDWIDE NA NA 
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS (TI) USA ASIA/EUROPE/US 64 35000 
TIETO FINLAND OY FINLAND EUROPE/RUSSIA 16 14000 
TOMTOM NETHERLANDS EMEA 24 3500 
TOPCON POSITIONING SYSTEMS JAPAN WORLDWIDE 83 NA 
TRIMBLE NAVIGATION USA USA/ASIA/EUROPE 37 6600 
TRX SYSTEMS USA NATIONAL 11 50 
UBISENSE LTD UK EUROPE/USA 13 NA 
UBLOX UK WORLDWIDE 18 NA 
VISIOGLOBE FRANCE WORLDWIDE 10 NA 
WIFARER CANADA WORLDWIDE 5 NA 
W-OASIS TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
LTD 
CHINA NA 8 NA 
ZENESIS NETWORKS INDIA NATIONAL NA NA 
 
The following tables contain classifications of the alliance members according to country of origin, 
areas served and number of employees. 
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Graph 1. ILA companies classification: country of origin (headquarter) 
 
Graph 2. ILA companies classification: areas served 
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Graph 3. ILA companies classification: number of employees 
 
 
In the following page is listed the broad set of partners selected according to the overall amount of 
active participation in the consortium’s operations: the amount of participation has been induced 
from a close inspection of field notes, meeting minutes and archival documents. The information on 
each company is specular to the previous table enlisting the totality of partners with the addition of 
the number of employees staffed for dealing with the consortium’s operations: 
  
20
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42
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10000
BETWEEN 10000 AND
100000
ABOVE 100000
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Table 2. selection of ILA companies 
COMPANY NATIONALITY AREAS SERVED AGE  AGE EMPLOYEES STAFF 
ACCENTURE UK LTD UK WORLDWIDE 1989 26 319000 2 
ATANDT LABS, NETWORK 
TECHNOLOGIES 
USA NATIONAL 1983 32 243000 2 
BROADCOM USA ASIA/USA 1991 24 10650 1 
CISCO USA WORLDWIDE 1984 31 74000 1 
CSR PLC UK WORLDWIDE 1998 17 2130 1 
DIALOG SEMICONDUCTOR UK ASIA 1981 34 573 1 
ESRI USA WORLDWIDE 1969 46 2700 1 
FRAUNHOFER PORTUGAL 
RESEARCH  
GERMANY WORLDWIDE 1949 66 20000 1 
GENASYS SPAIN EUROPE/AMERICA 2000 15 50 1 
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES 
CO. 
CHINA WORLDWIDE 1987 28 150000 1 
INDOORS GMBH AUSTRIA USA/EUROPE 2010 5 30 2 
INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
TAIWAN ASIA 1973 42 NA NA 
INSITEO FRANCE EUROPE 2009 6 50 NA 
INTEL USA WORLDWIDE 1968 47 107600 10 
ISEELOC USA NA 2014 1 8 1 
LAMBDA:4  GERMANY NATIONAL 2004 11 NA 4 
LOCUSENSE AB SWEDEN NATIONAL 2013 2 4 1 
MARVELL  USA WORLDWIDE 1995 20 7500 1 
MEDIATEK TAIWAN WORLDWIDE 1997 18 7000   
NAVANU USA NATIONAL 2011 4 10 1 
NOKIA FINLAND WORLDWIDE 1865 150 61000 10 
NOMADIC SOLUTIONS FRANCE NATIONAL 2003 12 10 1 
NORDIC 
SEMICONDUCTOR 
NORWAY EUROPE/US 1983 32 185 1 
NORDIC TECHNOLOGY 
GROUP 
SWEDEN NATIONAL NA NA NA NA 
QUALCOMM USA WORLDWIDE 1985 30 26000 3 
QUUPPA FINLAND EUROPE 2012 3 10 3 
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS SOUTH 
KOREA 
WORLDWIDE 1988 27 326000 2 
SONY MOBILE JAPAN WORLDWIDE 2001 14 7100 1 
SPECSEATS USA NATIONAL 1993 22 NA 1 
SPIRENT UK USA/ASIA/EUROPE 1936 79 1500 1 
TELECOM ITALIA ITALY EUROPE/SOUTH 
AMERICA 
1994 21 65000 2 
TRIMBLE NAVIGATION USA USA/ASIA/EUROPE 1978 37 6600 1 
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The main guest of the meeting that set the inception of ILA was Qualcomm, a US-based chipset 
maker supplying many handset manufacturers that has a platform leadership in Wi-fi technologies 
for the mobile industry. In the following graph the size of the consortium is measured with the 
number of partners of the alliance. 
Graph 4. ILA size during the study 
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PART 2 
Fellow Travelers in an open ecosystem 
Indoor positioning is a long standing promise in the field of telecommunications and, indeed, many 
products and services already exist by different firms, however, what was sought by ILA was a 
more precise solution3, eventually capable to be adopted through a sort of acceleration program 
enabled by the alliance project. This was considered possible with the co-existence within the same 
project of a twofold scope pushed by the ILA top management in setting the strategic intent: a work 
of harmonization of the system architecture that should take into account the results and the 
certifications of the individual pilots performed by partners with the alliance: the following image is 
extracted from the original presentation shown at the consortium’s first meeting in September 2012. 
 
Figure 4. ILA’s basic logic of knowledge flow 
                                                          
3 Existing solutions in 2013 were not accurate enough to be precise below the meter, what was sought by ILA was a 
sub-meter accuracy 
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What is represented is that the effort was aimed to aggregate individual pilots from partners willing 
to collaborate, share the results, certify them and keep it as background knowledge; then the same 
results had to be communicated as a technical feedback to the system architecture working group 
that, once verified the congruence of the results with the architecture, was supposed to re-enter into 
the “alliance knowledge” such verification and close the circle of knowledge sharing. 
Such collaborative journey implies the instrumental use of the space of collaboration, with each 
company pushing for its own interest: first among these was Nokia. The former Finnish giant was 
desperately trying to reposition its offering and have some kind of return from the huge amount of 
work done in the lab during its glorious recent past; but it also needed to literally re-construct an 
industrial landscape around; opening the HAIP architecture4 could contribute to re-position the 
company (eventually) as a platform provider: the ambition was to reach mass market volumes in the 
offering, with a pivotal role to be played by Nokia Here, a division of Nokia that manages data of 
indoor maps, and Quuppa, a spinoff using the HAIP technology with a licensing agreement with the 
parent organization. Nonetheless, the HAIP solution is based on a Bluetooth standard, that is highly 
accurate but at the same time not even close to the wide market penetration of Wi-fi-based 
applications, protocols and standards. Therefore, the invitation from Nokia to some Tlc giants such 
as Qualcomm was purposed to find an harmonization in terms of solutions but more importantly in 
terms of market penetration and embeddedness. 
The whole operation set up by Nokia is called in industrial jargon “to open up an ecosystem”: the 
consortium initiator’s stake was strongly based on the possibility to put itself as a keystone for the 
complementary niches of indoor positioning and exactly for this purpose brought on the table its 
HAIP system architecture and the companies populating the ecosystem; of course, as many 
                                                          
4 High accurate indoor positioning 
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interviews during the first months of operations testify, Nokia people was perfectly aware of the 
risks connected to such opening in terms of knowledge spillovers, but from the data what seems 
most pertinent is the possibility that they were simply trading the architecture knowledge for 
expertise5. The expertise of Qualcomm and of those partners such as CSR, Broadcom and Cisco 
Systems, that later resulted the core constituents of a coalition led by Qualcomm, was instrumental 
for the work on the architecture whose final outcome was planned as a Final Specification to be sent 
to a generic Standard Development Organization. 
Therefore, the collaboration and value co-creation strategy was highly complementary and centered 
around the shared purpose of fostering the HAIP solution by tapping different pools of knowledge: 
the knowledge embodied by the technical baseline for modifications offered by Nokia; and the 
knowledge embodied tacitly by Us-based representatives in the field of location and positioning. 
But whereas the building blocks of this shared purpose were seemingly fitting and in a 
complementary fashion, the outcome was also instrumental to corporate intents radically different 
between the two players: although Nokia’s intent was not a competitive threat for them, 
Qualcomm’s goal was to strengthen its world leadership and advance towards its long-term 
objective, i.e. “make location ubiquitous”. On the contrary, although the achievement of the Nokia’s 
intent was dependent on the possibility to foster adoption throughout the ecosystem also through the 
work of Qualcomm on the system architecture, its temporal horizon was shorter: it is useful to 
remind in this regard that the introduction of the iPhone in 2007 and the advent of Android two 
years later literally displaced Nokia’s dominance in the market of mobile handsets and devices. The 
                                                          
5 A note on the technology: the architecture was based on BT and therefore needed to be worked on to become network-
centric and compliant with the Wi-fi; therefore, the baseline without work on Wi-fi specifications had a limited 
usefulness on a short term. 
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troublesome condition of the Finnish company is synthesized by the speech that CEO Stephen Elop 
gave to the 2011 annual meeting: 
“(…) there is a pertinent story about a man who was working on an oil platform in the North Sea. 
He woke up one night from a loud explosion, which suddenly set his entire oil platform on fire. In 
mere moments, he was surrounded by flames. Through the smoke and heat, he barely made his way 
out of the chaos to the platform's edge. When he looked down over the edge, all he could see were 
the dark, cold, foreboding Atlantic waters. As the fire approached him, the man had mere seconds to 
react. He could stand on the platform, and inevitably be consumed by the burning flames. Or, he 
could plunge 30 meters in to the freezing waters. The man was standing upon a "burning platform," 
and he needed to make a choice. He decided to jump. It was unexpected. In ordinary circumstances, 
the man would never consider plunging into icy waters. But these were not ordinary times - his 
platform was on fire. The man survived the fall and the waters. After he was rescued, he noted that 
a "burning platform" caused a radical change in his behavior. 
We too, are standing on a "burning platform," and we must decide how we are going to change our 
behavior. (…)”6 
Taking advantage of an in-vivo conceptualization suggested by an informant about the research 
context, I termed the companies populating the consortium “fellow travelers”: the term Fellow 
Travelers7 indicates the companies and the people involved in a collaboration journey, conscious of 
being somewhat obliged to travel together on the same route to achieve a shared purpose. It is 
useful to consider that such condition is not necessarily joyful: decision-making processes had to be 
                                                          
6 The speech and the full memo of Elop can be found at http://www.engadget.com/2011/02/08/nokia-ceo-stephen-elop-
rallies-troops-in-brutally-honest-burnin/ 
7 From here FT 
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vested with strong political traits in order to influence the direction of the journey towards not only 
the shared purpose but, more importantly, on each company’s expected benefit from the journey 
itself.  
The collaborative journey 
The collaborative path started with the assignment of two main tasks, i.e. the work on the system 
architecture and the pilot program, respectively to Qualcomm and Nokia. The alliance inception, the 
system architecture work and the pilot program were the three initiatives from where the following 
23 initiatives studied originated in the following months; but whereas the strategic intent was aimed 
to take the collaboration forward keeping the Wi-fi and BT technologies explicitly separated and 
respectively sponsored by Qualcomm and Nokia in the broad technological field of positioning, it 
also contained elements that were the outcome of a natural negotiation between the two companies’ 
interests. In the agenda presentation of the first ILA official meeting (September 2012) the scope is 
listed in: 
- The “wish” of the Definition of specifications of description of protocols/functions for 
indoor positioning in their enabling use with indoor maps, digital guidance and navigation and 
related; 
- As a SIG the focus was on solutions whose technical and commercial fulfilments were 
identified in high accuracy, low power consumption and mobility; 
- The primary technological options for solutions are equally BT and Wi-fi; 
- The “wish” to promote and encourage broad industry adoption of the specs. 
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Figure 5. ILA scope at alliance project inception 
In the two final sentences of the document an important exchange is agreed upon in terms of the 
two means identified to accomplish the ILA goal: the adoption is “encouraged by choosing to 
contribute one or more specs to Industrial Trade Associations or Standard Development 
Organizations” (mainly pushed by regulatory intents of the US firms); also, through the “wish” to 
make available licensing of IP to each other during the process of development and implementation 
of the Final Specification on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (availability pushed by Nokia 
for its interest at the ecosystem level). 
The inception of the common path of FT was therefore marked with a structure of multiple interests 
nested under an overarching goal of collaboration: correspondently, for each interest one or more 
additional initiatives were put in place, according to the progress achieved and the issues raised and 
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considered relevant by FT during the collaboration; eventually, issues particularly relevant started 
to be “occupied” either through the creation of work groups or similar micro-groupings (such as the 
work on the system architecture identified at the inception or the promotion effort later on) or 
through initiatives specifically devoted to the accomplishment of a task (such as the issue of the use 
cases to be identified that led to an initiative of business modeling and analysis).  
In the following figure a timeline of the initiative planned and eventually selected is offered to give 
a visual representation: on September 2012 the “icebreaking” initiative called “Industry alliance” is 
put in place at Nokia House in Espoo, Finland: under this initiative the interests related to the 
technology adoption and to the wish of contributing to a Final Specification could take the form of, 
respectively, the “pilot program” and the “system architecture” initiative. Later on, once these had 
been performed in a recurrent way so that to form a stable group of work, other initiatives were 
pushed from them. The same mechanisms occurred during the second phase of mutation of the 
consortium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Timeline of initiatives at ILA inception (see next page) 
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The initial agreement was based on a knowledge convergence that could eventually be brought forth 
to the technological level because the initial position was to keep separated Bluetooth and Wi-fi 
solutions. Nonetheless, the modest progress of the pilot program operations achieved by Nokia led 
progressively to a loss of momentum regarding the Bluetooth and to a corresponding mutation of 
the initial scope to a different organizing principle (i.e “what do we do?”). In fact, two years and a 
few months after the alliance inception (December 2014, interview # 141219) the ILA’s scope was 
resembling the mission of a lobby group exclusively focusing on the willingness to influence, 
through its work on specifications, some Standard Development Organizations such as OMAs. This 
became the ILA scope although the work on the system architecture was still ongoing: the parallel 
array of actions initiated to foster adoption through a market strategy was no more based on the 
openness of a global ecosystem but fundamentally US-based and motivated by an infrastructural 
development strongly endorsed by American carriers and equally criticized by European members. 
Therefore, FT not only had changed the ultimate arrival of their common path: Qualcomm and the 
companies composing its coalition were able to modify the final goal of FT towards a hybrid and 
technologically agnostic architecture (in other words an architecture not explicitly based on Wi-fi 
nor Bluetooth), and a market adoption strongly driven by regulatory (and US-specific) logics that 
were not shared by other FTs. It also changed the people indirectly controlling the strategic decision 
making process, with the power to decide for the whole fellowship what was reasonable to do and 
what was not ultimately accruing to a restricted group of firms. 
Whereas this shift of control was informal and indirect, the change occurring at the level of the 
organizing principle was not countered by mobilization activities or contrasting actions by the 
defeated: on the contrary, the slow shift of control and the organizing principle mutation involved 
also the Nokia people formally leading the fellowship: these, although striving to have at least one 
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individual pilot (the pilot program had zero pilots completed) and therefore continuing in their 
attempts for improving the program, interrupted all ecosystem-level initiatives within ILA and 
gradually moved their contribution toward the development of connections with other interest and 
lobbying groups in the field (such as Galileo and the Open Geospatial Consortium), similarly to 
what brought forth by Qualcomm and friends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Initiatives during the mutation phase of the ILA organizing principle (see next page) 
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Mutation of the organizing principle 
Indeed, the concomitant advancement of the work on the system architecture and the progressive 
increase in the number of members brought the allies to mutate strongly the intent of the whole 
alliance-operation: this determined a slow but visible shift in terms of control, from Nokia to 
Qualcomm and its coalition, and of organizing principle, from an ecosystem-in-the-making to a 
lobby and pressure group with market adoption driven by regulators and US carriers. Although the 
strong cultural distance between members and a general lack of leadership skills from the part of the 
Alliance initiator may explain the mutation of the organizing principle, what results ultimately 
puzzling of such mutation is related to the actual means used by the winning coalition in terms of 
strategies of interaction and value co-creation: the mutation was not coincident with an interruption 
of the alliance project but allowed the whole fellowship to have a better understanding of the 
internal and external influences over the field and, ultimately, to embrace the new organizing 
principle through an ex-post rationalization. In other words, the spaces of collaboration enabled by 
the alliance were used as means to tap different kinds of knowledge. 
In the following sections the analysis of the data is described and the rationale of the inductive 
process of theory building is sketched in order to investigate empirically such mutation. 
  
40 
 
 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Data collection 
The data collection took 13 months (March 2013-April 2014): during such period, I conducted 52 
open-ended interviews, participated to weekly online meetings, 3 plenary meetings (two in the San 
Francisco Bay area, one in Taiwan) and several workshops along with the collection of field data 
(notes, emails, demonstrations, presentations and informal conversations with informants): the 
whole list of types of data collected is in the table 3. 
 
Table 3. Classification of the data collected 
The main research method is the embedded case studies method (Yin, 1989) as analysis of data 
comprises 26 initiatives that ultimately resulted very different in terms of initiators, resources, 
tactics used to attract consensus and evolution; each of these undertakings was bundled under the 
“umbrella” of the whole consortium project that, though evolving from its inception, provided a 
context sufficiently stable to provide external validity to the theoretical insights extracted from the 
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analysis of the initiatives. The collection of evidence from different sources allowed for 
triangulation while analyzing data (Miles and Hubermann, 1994) and followed a two-stage 
approach, especially for the themes developed during the interviews: in the first stage, the focus of 
the interviews was mainly on the whole functioning of the consortium and its working groups in 
order to understand thoroughly the characteristics of the strategy making process. Later on, the 
collection of data was geared more on understanding the evolution of the initiatives put in place by 
members. 
Methodology of data reduction and analysis 
Adopting a grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) in the analysis of the data 
collected on the field I constantly went back and forth from data to theory in a process of theoretical 
sampling until theoretical saturation was reached: supported in the analysis by the software NVIVO, 
I systematically coded actions and interactions put in place by fellow travelers so to scrutinize the 
micro-dynamics of the initiatives. I focused on the initiatives put in place because these units of 
analysis were crossing the entire spectrum of either visible and latent operations of the consortium: 
in other words, they allowed me to observe not only the consortium’s formal structure, i.e. working 
groups, task forces and administrative seats, but also the latent coalitions shadowing the formal 
organization and capable to influence dramatically the outcome of the initiatives and, with them, the 
consortium’s fate. During the process of coding the list of codes has been constantly enriched in 
order to incorporate previous findings on strategic initiatives at the corporate level (Burgelman, 
1983; Floyd and Lane, 2000, Noda and Bower, 1996, Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000), issue selling 
(Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill and Lawrence, 2001), global teams (Cramton and Hinds, 2014) and 
technology ecosystem governance (Wareham, Fox and Cano Giner, 2014). 
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Figure 7. Methodology 
Coding procedure 
This section of the work describes the analysis performed on the data collected; the analytical phase 
of the work included various steps that resembled the three phases of coding theorized by Corbin 
and Strauss (2014): first, a process of open coding where data is “fractured”, events are given 
conceptual label and grouped in categories and subcategories in order to move gradually from 
gerunds or in-vivo codes to analytical categories and overarching themes.. Also, the open coding 
process was performed on the information gathered on companies from interviews, documents of 
the ILA repository and field notes: when missing, company information was collected through 
Hoover’s company profile reports and companies’ websites and cross-checked with information 
gathered in the field an during informal conversations.  This led the analysis to various outcomes 
such as a descriptive classification of the companies populating the consortium and listed in the 
previous section. It also paved the way to the identification of concepts representing facets of the 
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dynamics of collaboration as experienced by Fellow Travelers; through a process of code 
refinement and grouping, these ultimately resulted in categories sufficiently meaningful. A 
substative portion of the information derived was collected through the ethnographic work on the 
field and contained in field notes and memos: this part of the data resulted fundamental to 
complement the information extracted from the coding process and to structure more deeply the 
consortium’s operations: these resulted unfolding through group undertakings that I named 
initiatives. 
The analysis of the initiatives pursued by FT was done in a processual perspective to understand 
how they evolved: crossing notes taken during plenaries and on-line work group meetings, 
presentations, meeting minutes and informants’ opinions it was possible to draw the flow of the 
initiatives during the field work and detect from which previous initiative new ones were originated 
and proposed. Therefore, the analysis of the initiatives was done through a narrative account 
because the main goal was to uncover the sequence of causal links between different stages and 
highlight the mechanisms employed by the organization for the selection of each initiative 
(Langley, 1999). Though the narratives developed had rich meaning and content, the identification 
of the causal links required further analysis and comparison between initiatives: following recent 
literature on the strategy making process (Canales, 2015), the comparison of the different initiatives 
was done using the interviews but also archival data, in order to use at least two sources of evidence 
to describe the evolution of each initiative (Yin, 1994, p.69). the comparison was done using a 
timeline and clustering on the characteristics of each initiative. 
A second stage of the analysis was done through a process of axial coding: here data are put back 
together by making connection between categories and the aim of this phase of coding is to specify 
each category in terms of causal conditions, context, intervening conditions and interactive strategy. 
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The analysis of the initiatives and their clustering during the first phase of axial coding allowed a 
more thorough understanding of the dynamics affecting FT journey. In a second phase the axial 
coding has been performed on an aggregate level in order to theorize relationships between the 
categories identified. Finally, the phase of selective coding that constitutes the basics of the 
theoretical contribution of a grounded theory: it builds theory on the dynamics of collaboration 
enlarging the strategy making operationalization toward inter-organizational settings. It was done 
selecting the core category, i.e. “Fellow travelers”: performing a continuous iteration of the 
connections of the core category with the others relationships between categories have been 
validated, in order to develop a theoretical generalization from the phenomenon observed. 
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RESULTS OF THE CODING PROCEDURE: CATEGORIES AND INITIATIVES 
The phase of open coding on the data led to the identification of 314 first-order codes, successively 
arranged in parent-child codes (49 parent codes + 161 child codes); these were grouped under 8 
categories (see table 3) that resulted meaningfully descriptive of the context but still not sufficient 
to perform a phase of axial coding. 
A FELLOW TRAVELERS 
B 
ORGANIZING 
PRINCIPLE 
C "FORUM" LIFE 
D INITIATIVES 
E 
TECHNICAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
F 
BUSINESS 
CONVERGENCE 
(OUTDOOR-INDOOR) 
G 
CONTEXTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
H ALLIANCE-AS-A-TOOL 
 
Table 3. Categories 
 
As said, the open coding procedure was complemented by the identification of group undertakings 
named initatives. Initiatives were considered so in a broadly manner and corresponded to an 
undertaking or opening move initiated by a FT to respond to a latent or perceived issue affecting the 
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path of FT: an example is given by the following quotes: in introducing the rationale for 
establishing the use cases working group, the ILA chair said: 
“ (…) then we have the use case working group in which we have use cases, business cases and 
environment, very relevant, because it’s important to understand from the investors’ point of view 
"what are the cases where we can start to see this kind of thing going to be done" and "what is 
relevant, who are the players, and...and...what is the speed of the deployment, et cetera?", and that’s 
very relevant.” (Interview # 130418, April 2013) 
In another interview, an inception is described as aimed “so that can be taken in consideration an 
array of use cases (…) that can allow the design of those business models that are not only those 
pushed by the big partners but that can result of interest also to others.” (Interview # 130404, April 
2013) 
Initiatives are listed in table 4: they were categorized according to the content, their originator(s), 
the type of confrontation and the outcome in terms of success. 
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Table 4. Classification of ILA initiatives  
 
The consortium as a whole started to allocate a budget for the different working groups only in the 
final part of the fieldwork (January-March 2014), once a new legal framework was agreed and in 
place and membership fees started to be collected with amounts different according to the 
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membership level. Prior to this transition, FT were participating on a complete voluntary basis: this 
means that the participation to the whole consortium depended on the resources allocated to them 
by the companies, i.e. time, money and staff. 
The most meaningful distinction is the one between initiatives that had for FT a recurrent and 
meaningful enactment and those that hadn’t; the distinction is not completely conceptual but instead 
full of high practical relevance for two reasons: first, spaces of discussion and collaboration deemed 
as particularly important, such as the whole consortium interest over the field of indoor positioning, 
are organized in recurrent activities, i.e. working groups; on the other side the activities performed 
that are not completely attached to the upper scope but nonetheless formally approved because of 
their eventual positive outcomes remained simple task-oriented (and time-efficient) activities. 
Second, the eventual selection of the initiative and its implementation in the current activities is a 
necessary step for many actors to get visibility in the eyes of fellow travelers and have a space of 
negotiation for pursuing the intent of the alliance and, perhaps more importantly, their own. The 
figure 8 below is a portion of the ILA process story and is selected to clarify this point: the parent 
initiative is the “industry alliance”, from which the “system architecture” and “pilot program” were 
originated and successfully selected as activities whose recurrence and shared benefits were 
recognized: all such three initiatives are depicted squared to indicate that they were established and 
then recurrently pursued; other initiatives, in this exemplar case blooming from the pilot program 
initiative, were either successful, such as the square referring to the pilot profiling activity, or 
unsuccessful, such as the round ones referring to initiatives such as the “promotion” initiative and 
the “Quuppa expertise” initiative: these activities didn’t meet neither the support of the alliance 
chair nor the endorsement from other fellow travelers. They could be completely discarded, stalled 
or post-posed, as happened with the “promotion” initiative (officially started in December 2013), 
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the “use case” initiative (post-posed in its inception in December 2012) and the “self-promotion” 
activity (stalled in June 2013). 
 
 
Figure 8. First initiatives put in place by ILA 
The events that explained the progression of each initiative were established from initiation to a 
planned termination or the achievement of the expected results. It is possible to see from figures 6 
and 7 those initiatives that ended up either because of a planned termination or for evident failure to 
attain the objective and those that ended up as recurrent activities of a working group or were able 
to achieve the expected results. I therefore clustered the initiatives similar in terms of the cited 
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characteristics and outcome: these analyses allowed the identification of three different types of 
initiatives termed: common-denominator, horizontal configuration and old-boys’ club. 
Initiatives and interactive strategies 
The analysis of the 8 categories identified as mostly salient and relevant to describe FT’s was 
performed scrutinizing the processual development of the alliance operations (i.e. the 26 initiatives) 
and the archival and interview data, in order to understand what are the interactive strategies used 
by FT. In the first phase this led to the specific grouping of the activities in 3 distinctive strategies 
of interaction (common-denominator, horizontal configuration and old-boys’ club). See the figure x 
in the following page for a visual representation. 
Old-boys’ club: the system architecture working group was composed by represantatives of big 
firms such as Qualcomm Atheros, Broadcom, CSR and Mediatek. They were highly experienced 
and extremely expert in the field of location: the activities were mostly based on the refinements on 
the system interfaces’ modifications and seldom were focused on initiatives out of this mandate: a 
notable exception occurred during the transition to the new legal framework, when the system 
architecture chair (and vice-chair of the alliance) was explicitly called by the ILA  
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Figure 9. Identification of the interactive strategies underlying ILA initiatives 
president for support in managing concerns and protests from the FTs that were refusing to sign the 
transition. Such episode is an instance of the kind of charisma that this prominent member exercises 
over the fellowship. The value co-creation strategy suggested by this group of initiatives was 
categorized Standard approach to industry creation because it is designed specifically to ensure 
technical interoperability between players: interoperability is granted implementing modifications 
in the system according to the technological requirements that fit would-be market players’ wishes. 
As a consequence, the work was pursued on a channel internal to the alliance: here the requirements 
from FTs were evaluated and eventually retained or rejected, therefore enabling and constraining 
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avenues where FTs could eventually build business cases (i.e extend the user experience); on the 
other side, the possibility to have the interfaces’ modifications to the system accepted by the most 
relevant Standard development organization (i.e the Open Mobile Alliance) required to build a 
relationship (or a liaison) with such organization. This led to an escalation in the SA working group 
way of working: the modifications, and more importantly the requirements asked by the use cases 
submitted for evaluation, progressively became evaluated on the basis of their accordance with a 
way of working accorded to what was taken for granted at OMA’s meetings8. Alternatively, they 
were filtered with a purely technical evaluation resting on a right-or-wrong logic, even when the use 
cases were explicitly designed to have the requirements correct and technically feasible. One 
episode on emergency services indicates how much the technical knowledge and expertise was 
instrumentally used by this group as a mean to exclude interests conflicting with those of the 
restricted circle of companies represented in the system architecture working group: an example is 
given by the account given by an European entrepreneur about such attitude: 
“(…) well, I’m satisfied about the discussion, so I think it’s a good idea to have discussions about 
ideas and I’m not satisfied with the feedback, especially from...there was this one, or maybe two, 
big points where Andreas and one other person, I don’t know his name at the moment, said “we 
don’t want these use cases”. So after that meeting I thought “ok, so why are you asking for use 
cases when you’re not open minded for use cases?”. But, at the end, in the last meeting, Fabio said 
“no, we will accept these use cases”. So…how do you say it…I’m interested in the ongoing 
                                                          
8 It is notable here that such attitude to refer to an institutionalized way of collaborating was diffused among the 
informants: each informant in fact underlined as mostly logic the way of working belonging to another collaborative 
space, not exclusively OMAs but also, for instance, the Wi-fi Alliance, the Open Geospatial Consortium or the 
Bluetooth Special Interest Group.  
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process, because I think now…we’re not coming from this political area, we’re thinking about use 
cases and we can propose these use cases and we can discuss the technical issues on these use cases, 
but we are not aware of these political discussions…” (interview # 131023, October 2013). 
A natural question rests on the reason why the selection was performed in such excluding fashion 
by the reference group of the alliance, in face of the declared openness in the whole alliance project: 
the evidence extracted through a triangulation of the data points to the crude fact that US-based 
companies simply needed to have a herding crowd backing their requests to the OMA in order to 
convince the SDO of the market virtuousness of the modifications. Such exploitation is also 
suggested by the following quote from an informant: 
“in OMA or standardizing contexts, you go there with a solution that is not only the solution of 
mine, but there’s a crowd of fifty players thinking that these innovations can benefit their businesses 
and those of their customers” (Intervista # 130404, April 2014) 
The closure attitude performed by this group resulted extremely frustrating for FTs not involved, 
especially for the group working on use cases: this group was in charge of collecting FTs’ use cases, 
passing these to the system architecture working group and ensure a reliable and constructive 
confrontation on the requirements proposed. Instead, the confrontation resulted destructive rather 
than constructive; how much such attitude resulted annoying by the use cases chair is expressed in 
this way:  
“Right now you may have a guess on how the process in the System Architecture working group is 
managed and their style…you’ve seen it”. (Interview # 140210, February 2014) 
Nonetheless, as depicted in table 4, all the initiatives put in place by the System Architecture 
working group resulted ultimately successful and contributed to advance the collaboration journey. 
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This in terms used in the strategy making stream means feasibility (possession of capabilities) and 
strategic fit (match of the initiative with the strategic intent) but not constructive confrontation 
(Canales, 2015). We investigated further in order to understand what factors explain this ability to 
contribute in the face of destructive confrontation: we went through the bios and CVs of the group 
participants resumed during the interviews and complemented by the information extracted on 
professional social networks. The two most salient characteristics resulted the high endowments of 
expertise and socio-professional embeddedness of participants in expert organizations such as the 
ILA or the OMA or the Wi-fi Alliance; a validation of this finding can be induced by two 
observations collected during the ethnography  and exclusive to the operations of this group: first, 
the meetings were recurrently characterized by humorist  conversations and gaffes between 
members that were simply impossible to formulate without a deep relational knowledge between 
members; second, this group was the only one that had a turnover in the chair seat: although the 
new chair shared the company of origin with his predecessor (i.e. Qualcomm), when introduced as 
the prospective new chair the guy was presented as an acquaintance of the audience, formed almost 
exclusively by system architecture group members and a few of Fellow Travelers: 
“the meeting with the group takes place in a separate room very similar to a classroom (…). In 
closing his presentation and the discussion, Stuart (the group chair) announces that he leaves the 
chair of the SA WG and that designated Andreas to guarantee continuity with the work achieved so 
far; in addition, “everybody knows Andreas since a long time”. (quote from field notes taken during 
the plenary meeting in Hsinchu, Taiwan, December 2013) 
Both factors, expertise and socio-professional embeddedness, appear in our evaluation important, 
and that’s the reason why the resulting interaction strategy has been labelled “old-boys club”. 
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Common denominator: the pilot program and the use cases working group result highly aligned in 
developing initiatives geared to put in place an integrative effort. A constant concern while planning 
and performing this kind of initiatives was to involve as much FTs as possible: of course, this was 
not aimed exclusively to make them feel comfortable with the fellowship but also to extract as 
much knowledge as possible from FTs in terms of potential markets, technological advancements 
and  relational knowledge: instrumental for all this was to ensure participation from FTs in an 
integrative effort. Exemplary of this dynamic was the open access to the alliance potentially granted 
to anybody, whatever the market position and power. Differently from the old-boys club, the 
initiatives performed were promoted during conference calls held twice in the day in order to be 
able to communicate to North America and Asian countries as well. The subtle but visible downside 
of this interactive strategy is the high inertia at the heart of originators’ actions: in order to obtain 
the highest agreement and participation the content of the initiatives was more geared to be wrapped 
up in a political fashion, resulting ultimately unattractive for FTs. In this sense a general sense of 
misunderstanding pervades the initiatives, that were mostly unsuccessful at the alliance level 
although successful in gaining chair’s support. In particular, originators of these initiatives were 
perceiving that the ecosystem in the making was a convergent phenomenon where the erosion of the 
boundaries between industrial fields such as consumer electronics and mobile services would 
necessarily lead to a new vertical, i.e. indoor positioning: in other words, their principal 
misunderstanding rested on the perception of a necessary convergence at the applicative phase of 
the knowledge pooled in the alliance. The work on business modeling is exemplary in this sense: in 
order to make the output of this initiative understandable and, as a consequence, acceptable, the 
prospective value chains had to be progressively reduced to a few and then to a unique one that was 
understandable but completely useless at the alliance level; its usefulness was exclusively addressed 
to satisfy the need for contextual and relational knowledge of the FT from Europe. However, most 
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of these initiatives resulted unsuccessful and irrelevant for FTs, these were usually planned through 
a political gestation in order to gain support and being put in place, and then evaluated as feasible 
afterwards and at a very superficial level. During the phase of support-seeking and negotiation over 
the content with ILA chair and influencers the match between the content and the strategic intent of 
broad industry adoption was deemed as necessary to start the initiative and originators planned the 
initiatives accordingly; once in place, the confrontation with the specific participants involved was 
highly constructive.  
Horizontal configuration: between the old-boys club and the FTs pushing common denominator 
strategies rested a “crowd” of FTs adopting an observing behavior: for these organizations, being a 
FT meant exclusively taking stock of and leverage the operations and connections enabled by the 
collaborative journey. Some of them tried to push their use cases for having the required 
modifications accepted but their requests have been consistently rejected by the system architecture 
group. Other, such as Asian carriers, never really changed their attitude of observing participants. 
Exemplar in this sense is the alliance use performed by Quuppa: instead of concentrating on a 
specific vertical industry this firm used the alliance to diversify its operations in very different 
verticals, such as retailers, supermarkets, hospitals and sports’ venues. They were doing this by 
operating horizontal configurations of value and trying to connect with value-added resellers, i.e. 
service firms already working with customers such as retailers, supermarket chains and store 
managers. Similar to Quuppa resulted firms such as Indoo.rs or Lambda4: the crowd was therefore 
composed by many firms, either purely observers or overtly acting and leveraging the contacts and 
contexts enabled by the alliance. The initiatives put in place resulted only partially successful: they 
had strategic fit but no feasibility, while the confrontation was consistently fitting. 
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INITIATIVE TYPE STRATEGIC FIT FEASIBILITY CONFRONTATION 
OLD-BOYS CLUB YES YES 
Internal: constructive 
External: destructive 
COMMON 
DENOMINATOR 
YES NO 
Completely 
constructive 
HORIZONTAL 
CONFIGURATION 
YES NO Passive/Puzzling 
 
Table 5. Comparison of clusters of initiatives: strategic fit, feasibility and confrontation. 
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Relationships between categories 
Fellow travelers 
The analysis of the initiatives and their clustering during the first phase of axial coding allowed a 
more thorough understanding of the dynamics affecting FT journey. In a second phase the axial 
coding has been performed on an aggregate level in order to theorize relationships between the 
categories identified (see figure 9 for a visual representation). First, the category “Fellow travelers” 
(A) has been picked as a central category because it encapsulates challenges and benefits of being 
part of the co-creation project; also, it underlines a common occurrence among fellow travelers, i.e. 
that company’s representatives were individuals on their own and not groups of managers. 
Individuals were generally seen as “the Broadcom guy”, or “the Cisco guy”. Very often they were 
seen as representing the whole company, although their attitude and proclivity to engage in co-
creation initiatives were highly personal. They were mostly free to decide about the right choice for 
their company’s interest and were at the same time backed and endorsed by their employer; more 
importantly, even when a company was represented by two or more managers, these were coming 
from different and in some cases competing divisions of the same firm. 
Such high ambiguity between the personal choice of interaction and the “weight” of the company 
represented fueled the recognition of the expertise expressed by FT toward the system architecture 
members: the expertise of these managers matched with the expectations of FTs toward the “forum” 
life, in the face of the destructive attitude adopted by these when selecting right or wrong 
requirements for the system. 
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Figure 9. Connection between categories 
This had two consequence: first, at the level of initiatives, those selected were mostly supportive of 
a “standards approach” to industry creation (D): in this approach, instead of trying to continuously 
recap and integrate all members’ knowledge under the alliance umbrella, the background 
knowledge co-created (E+G) is explicitly stored, as pointed by the quote from this interview to the 
System Architecture working group chair: 
“from the internal point of view it's…I started this process with the system architecture group 
because I wanted to make sure that we share a common vocabulary, that we have the same 
assumptions, and that if we had any unexamined assumptions that were different, then we had a 
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chance to argue those out and to…become a some sort of understanding, even if we don’t agree, at 
least we know what the points of difference are. I think is very important before we move to trying 
to do active work, that we make sure that we are all talking about the same thing and we understand 
each other’s interests, motivations, differences et cetera. So that’s really the important part 
internally for us so…part of the system vocabulary in the ally is talking about relationships and 
that’s the kind of internally oriented (…). So that’s the internal part of the issue. Externally we got a 
lot of questions about what the alliance is trying to do, what’s our aims, what’s our belief, how to 
have a lot of pieces stick together, and I respect...I don’t’ know whether or not we will publish the 
white paper in its full form, in its first release, or whether we will hold on for that, we’ll certainly 
publish at least a higher level summary of that that explains the basic vocabulary and content and 
what we’re doing and how we think the system needs to work, and what sort of organizations...other 
organizations we are targeting for...” (Interview # 130531, May 2013) 
In the initiatives aiming to pursue an “ecosystem strategy”, on the contrary, the same alliance output 
cited by the latter informant, and accounted as a mean for both internal and external use, i.e. the 
white paper, was used for many purposes fitting the strategic intent but was completely detached 
from the management of the background knowledge: 
“during the last weeks we worked mainly on taxonomic aspects, understand what industry, what 
applications in which industries can be mostly receptive and how, so we engaged an activity of 
taxonomy and performed a survey by giving it and seeking the contribution of members feeding us 
with interesting notations, now we aim to publish such survey in a white paper” (interview # 
141219, December 2014) 
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The initiatives that resulted less successful, as said, were trying to keep the fellowship integer 
through broad “umbrella” strategies very similar to ready-to-use formulas but fundamentally devoid 
of a shared meaning (E≠F); this is exemplified by the “packaging” given to many unsuccessful 
initiatives such as those where the indoor positioning industry was seen as a natural continuation of 
the outdoor navigation system. This is not to say that a novel industry has no origin or path-
dependency: in fact, many accounts collected on the evolution of the positioning technology for 
indoor spaces refer to the crossing of different disciplines such as the field of navigation, guidance 
or wireless communication. The point we’d like to stress is that the issue selling activity of these 
managers was cheaper and customized to grab the audience attention by easy formulas that didn’t 
work because many FTs were more interested to the background knowledge (E – technological 
sourcing or G – contextual knowledge) granted by slim fellowships such as the old-boys club. 
Although unsuccessful, the “ecosystem strategy” had the unexpected effect of increasing steeply the 
numerosity of the alliance (G). Unfortunately, also this by-product ultimately fueled the old-boys 
club: they could further legitimize through the crowd the interface modifications pushed to OMA 
with no costs for having the fellowship overcrowded but, instead, leveraging on it. 
The organizing principle 
The second category in order of importance and salience resulted the organizing principle, i.e. the 
meaning attached to the question “What do we do, as an organization?”. The organizing principle 
had a drift toward the direction wanted by the old-boys club: such direction points to the categories 
“external co-evolution” (a specific type of “alliance use” - H) and “architectural knowledge” (a 
specific type of technical knowledge - E) and supports the view of organizational adaptation as the 
outcome of a process of guided evolution. On the purely business side, this meant a final 
endorsement of the technology of reference, i.e. the Wi-fi and the terrestrial beacons (typically US-
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based); such solution popped up in the final months of the study and implied the possibility to have 
a standard de facto rather than de jure: having a standard de facto means the possibility, especially 
for on or more global MNCs with strong market power and penetration, to “block” the 
interoperability by turning the interfaces as proprietary ones and therefore “closing” the ecosystem9 
according to their own wish. The dialectic between such possibility and the more regulatory 
condition of a standard de jure correspond also to a deviation of the organizing principle toward a 
fellowship more on the consumer electronics side rather than the traditional way of industry 
creation in telecommunications. To sum up, the takeover and the resulting mutation of the 
organizing principle was the outcome of an action situated not within a company’s walls but in a 
space for inter-organizational collaboration called “fora”. 
Forum life 
The category “Forum life” is tied to the “Fellow travelers” category: it represents an instantiation of 
the induced though autonomous behavior observed, because most of Fellow Travelers had recurrent 
appointments and duties in fora, special interest groups, standardization bodies and lobby groups. 
Although taking part to this groups as company representatives, such acquaintances with the typical 
work and kinds of issues raised in a forum were highly valued not only in terms of technical 
knowledge or prestige but also for two forms of capital: for the knowledge of the specific context 
within this kind of bodies and for the subsequent prestige to the alliance as a whole once the liaison 
with other powerful bodies is finalized. Such prestige is a form of recognition that enlarges the 
interest represented by the alliance and that, in turn, makes the fellowship more capable to talk with 
another body from a peer-to-peer stance. These indicated an instrumental view from Fellow 
Travelers in respect to the potential gains for being part of the alliance: interests, under the process 
                                                          
9 In managerial jargon this is expressed as “breaking the bank” 
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of mutation of the organizing principle, started to get scaled accordingly to the expectations and 
take-home looked for each member: some adopted an observing behavior, in order to grab 
information and make sense of the alliance progress and the phase of convergence of the co-
creation activities. Many members that had actually no participation except voting were companies 
with national reach in terms of market and a substantive understanding of the system architecture: 
needless to say, these expectations are hugely disproportionated in respect to those of multinational 
device makers and chipset makers that need to have projections of sales in terms of millions. Other 
fellows simply tried to maximize from their participation: the falling leader was probaby the 
foremost in this attitude because, as said, pressed to have results as soon as possible, even running 
the risk of putting in place clumsy actions that were tracked as initiatives and whose account has 
been given previously. In order to give an example of an akward initiative, one of the most 
unsuccessful resulted the intiatives called “self-promotion” (of partners): this initiative was planned 
by the use case working groupleader and is a costituent of the cluster of initiatives called “common 
denominator” because was purposefully shooting at the crowd with the aim of grabbing as much 
information as possible from the partners. Members were invited to show up in order to “strengthen 
the alliance and make it a potential marketplace, by disclosing information about themselves on the 
alliance intranet as a way to self-promote themselves”. The information requested was very 
detailed: “business role, products/services, markets/industries/countries of interest, business role to 
partner with, distinctive competencies possessed, reference customers and achievements, contacts”. 
The initiative had no results and was not considered particularly relevant, but what is more 
interesting and informative on fellow travelers’ differences in knowledge about “forum life” is the 
final “NB”: “all info provided must be relevant to ILA and indoor location based services”, that is a 
mandate extremely hard to understand in such an exploratory and embrional phase of industry 
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creation. The difference in terms of knowledge of the forum life led fellow travelers toward 
different interactive strategies and a mutation of the organizing principle. 
Selective coding 
The most salient categories are represented in the figure 10. The drift of the organizing principle 
was not observed by looking at the identity of FTs but scrutinizing the initiatives put in place by 
them and their identity as well: the initiatives constitute the bulk of the so-called “forum life” 
experience that is driven toward value co-creation under and through the expertise belonging to a 
restricted circle of acquaintances. The individuals belonging to this club don’t share seats on 
companies’ boards but seats in standards development organizations where their expertise is the 
usual mean of social communication and currency of exchange for personal confrontation. At the 
same time, such expertise is recognized not on a purely technical basis but also because often 
coupled with knowledge about the context, i.e. the field of knowledge. Such contextual knowledge 
is fundamental in pushing innovations toward novel applications and this is testified by the fact that 
the losing coalition mimicked the old-boys club in its use of white papers or in the external 
connections sought: for example, they started to have conversations with the Open Geospatial 
Consortium, that is an old and powerful standard organization that works with the specifications of 
digital maps. 
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Figure 10. Selective coding and identification of the core category 
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The initiatives put in place by FT had been developed following the strategic intent set by founding 
members, i.e. “enabling broad industry adoption and foster commercial deployment in a mobile 
environment”. The ILA chair, an experienced Nokia manager formerly in charge of many projects 
at a corporate level, set such intent at alliance inception and although initiatives were selected upon 
approval of the majority of members their approval was strongly influenced by the fit of the 
proposal with the strategic intent. However, at the end of the field study the organizing principle, 
that is “what do we do, as an organization?”, was no more the construction of an ecosystem but the 
creation of a group of pressure and lobbying towards bodies of standardization. The organizational 
change occurred because of the shift of control from the hands of Nokia to a coalition formed by 
Qualcomm, Cisco Systems, Broadcom; Samsung and CSR. This coalition was able to catch the 
control over consortium’s fate by putting in place “old-boys club” initiatives endowed with strategic 
fit (i.e. a match of the initiative proposed with the strategic intent) and feasibility (i.e. capabilities) 
at the same time and resulted highly successful. On the contrary, “common denominator” initiatives 
were designed to gain management support through strategic fit first, then by demonstrating 
feasibility on the run; most of them resulted unsuccessful. Thirdly, a “crowd” of members pursued 
“horizontal configuration” strategies by jockeying between different verticals and got involved into 
the alliance operations only when interested to the knowledge co-created by the old-boys club or to 
the contextual knowledge allowed by the occasions of interaction such as plenary meetings or 
conference calls. 
Such crowd of fellow travelers mostly adopted an observing behavior: we guess that for these firms 
the alliance was a mean for establishing informal relations and acquire fundamental contextual 
knowledge for diversifying their technological knowledge into many different industries: such 
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redeployment was not aimed to go to the end-customer in a vertical fashion but directed to have 
working relations with companies close to the end-customer, the so-called VAS (Value-added 
resellers); such strategy of horizontal configuration is put in place by start-ups or small firms aiming 
to deploy their technological innovations in many sectors and through such VAS because they don’t 
have the resources to customize their solutions for any customers and the routinized ability to keep 
the pace of customization with the end-customers’ requirements. On the contrary, the standards 
approach of fellow travelers operating at a global scale and enormous volumes of revenues was on 
an opposite direction: they needed to have a certain amount of volume of transactions before 
entering or creating a novel industry. Especially for such operation a collaborative journey entails a 
long temporal horizon and the possibility to have an interoperable sets of standard shared with 
strategic industry players, literally “stimulated the greed of some of us” (quote from interview # 
20131028 with informant). In-between is possible to observe the position of “common 
denominators” initiators, whose main concern is to have results from the time and resources 
invested. 
What’s surprising about these findings when compared to recent advancements of the strategy 
making stream (Canales, 2015) is that the organizational change allowed by its adaptation didn’t 
occur through a process of constructive confrontation this type of confrontation, when iteratively 
enacted, should support the organization to understand what pieces or activities can be added to the 
system and what cannot without threatening its “functioning”. On the contrary, evidence indicates 
that power accrued progressively to the initiators less prone to have constructive confrontations, but 
mostly destructive toward proposals coming from a different group or from a member not part of 
the system architecture working group; at the same time, the power vanished progressively from the 
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hands of those more prone to have constructive confrontations or more benevolent in favoring the 
proposition of others’ views.  
This attitude was fulfilled by adopting broad and seemingly complementary agreements marked by 
small wins: for example, many times the simple possibility to have a telephone conversation with a 
fellow traveler working for a company based in another continent was deemed as a valuable result 
even when the conversation had no particularly positive outcome or actually didn’t happen at all. 
This suggests that, besides the business opportunities, the most common interest in stake for fellow 
travelers is the acquisition of different types of knowledge, either technological or contextual or 
relational, around the field of interest. We therefore suggest in the discussion part a theoretical 
framework capable to explain why such dynamics of co-creation are not fully determined by 
strategic fit and feasibility and why the organizational drift was fueled by a dynamic contrary to the 
constructive confrontation. That is, the concepts at the heart of the strategy making stream and its 
account of organizational change: of course, the aim is not to disconfirm this perspective in its 
traditional focus of attention, i.e. the intra-corporate venturing process, rather to enlarge its 
theoretical framework to inter-organizational settings by adding an expert-based view of power. 
Such explanation is consistent with previous work on technology convergence (Hacklin, 2007) and 
forms of power in project-based settings (Dahlander and O’ Mahony, 2011). 
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Competing interests “nested” 
It’s useful from an analytical point of view to think about a basic agreement for collaboration as a 
compromise synthesizing competing but complementary interests: but from a phenomenon-driven 
perspective, and considering how much stake is entailed by processes of innovation in high-velocity 
environments (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois III. 1988), this is fundamentally simplistic. Indeed, and 
only assuming these are somehow sketched and formulated, private interests may be partially 
overlapping one with the other, making the agreed one different in terms of scope from the mere 
sum of the parts. This assertion is consistent with ecosystem theory that stresses the benefits of 
collaboration between a product maker and its complementing elements: but the fact that private 
interests at the inception of collaborative journeys are not perfectly fitting leaves open a twofold 
question about what kind of imperfect configurations do they take and how are they eventually 
harmonized and negotiated in the making. 
We argue that instead of fitting one with the other, objectives are more likely to be nested under an 
overarching (though agreed) interest:  
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Figure 11 – Competing interests nested 
Under the blue-colored scope interests fit within an overarching higher order framework; under the 
black-colored scope they are attached and nested under a bigger and overarching umbrella: what we 
suggest with this assertion is that an overarching objective can help to keep in its shadow other 
more individual objectives that are overlapping and competing; if such individual objectives are 
pursued through decision-making processes and initiatives accounting for the political aspects of the 
opportunity race, they might be likely to change in dimensions and orientation at time 2, ultimately 
affecting and moving the overarching objective. 
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Thus, in a dynamic fashion, it’s misleading to say that private interests are kept in the shadow, 
instead they are worked on in the shadow of an overarching scope. Underlying the conceptual 
proximity of this idea with the umbrella strategy developed by Mintzberg and Waters (1985), it’s 
useful to contextualize at an inter-organizational level the dynamism and reckless unsettledness of 
the individual interests and the consequential shift of the overarching scope: quoting Mintberg and 
Waters, “when an arm pokes outside the umbrella, you either pull it in, leave it there (although it 
might get wet), or move the umbrella over to cover it (1985: 264)”. We’d like to qualify the latter 
move by considering that, once the umbrella is open (and in conditions of loose control over the 
nested interests), the interdependencies and links created by the overlap between the individual 
interests will force the umbrella to follow the outing process and leave out organizational actions 
that ultimately resulted wiped out, such as the left ones in respect  to the black-colored scope of 
Figure 11. The lack of organizational control over the sub-objectives makes such process unfeasible 
if objectives are fitting perfectly because the scope will need to be reformulated and this is seldom 
the case unless individual objectives are legitimized to overlap. 
This poses a formidable challenge when the terrain of contention is promising in terms of 
opportunities: it stresses the political aspects of decision-making processes because no individual 
objective is admittedly legitimized to replace the collective one nor overwhelm it if different parties 
are called at the table. 
Politics of decision making in the literature 
Foundational studies on the politics of decision-making depicts decision-makers as having different 
goals: they come together through coalitions and (usually) the preferences of the more powerful 
triumph (March, 1962, Eisenhardt and Bourgeouis, 1988, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992); forming 
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a coalition with external entities is not the only possible move to secure cooperation as others may 
include cooptation, strategic use of information, agenda setting and use of outside experts. 
Importantly, an implied articulation of many studies on politics of decision-making is that 
coalitions, i.e. social reifications of processes of coalescence around interests, are basic social 
groupings that ultimately are used as means for changing power structures: power structures are in 
turn composed by other coalitions around other opportunities. Indeed, Narayanan and Fahey (1982) 
have theorized the micro-politics of decision-making processes by offering perspectives of 
organizations as political entities where coalitions form around interests and demands that originate 
either within and outside them (Thompson, 1967, Mintzberg, 1983); the gestation of decisions is the 
last step in a process of logical incrementalism that starts when individuals become cognizant of an 
issue (1). 
 
Figure 12. the political process of strategic decision making (from Narayanan and Fahey, 1982) 
Once a sufficient level of clarity and appropriateness permits to use basic social scripts such as 
language, the issue can be articulated and leads toward the mobilization of others by increasing the 
number of inter-relationships around the issue (2): when action to resolve the issue is considered 
unavoidable a coalition forms (3) that later interact with others (4) and through the use of gambits 
and stratagems leads to a decision (5).  
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What decision? Any decision can be fine until it’s broad and overarching enough to create an 
umbrella strategy under which individual interests can be prospectively worked on while obscured 
and covert (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985): it is at this crucial point of organizational decision that 
we think ecosystems’ original formulations need to be qualified and extended in order to include a 
certain degree of pro-activeness by companies in responding to opportunities: we argue that 
companies will try to frame the whole nested array of interests into a functioning structure of 
collaboration instrumental for their different and competing interests. Basically at the dark, they’ll 
be cognitively forced to give sense to their actions under conditions of bounded rationality (Simon, 
1991) and will follow a simultaneous logic of appropriateness and association (Holm, 1995). 
New forms of inter-firm interactions 
As said, processes of vertical disintegration and industrial commoditization very often entail the 
necessity for companies to engage in inter-firm relations and gatherings because of the threats for 
their survival implied by such trends. Commoditization is sometimes referred to as the opposite of 
opportunity because narrows down the scope of a company’s offering, transforming into a 
commodity or a utility what once was a differentiated product or an innovative service: 
commoditization is considered a nightmare in ecosystems’ theory (Moore, 1993). Phone services or 
electricity are typical examples of offerings that became commoditized due to co-evolutionary 
processes of convergence of knowledge, i.e. not under a firm’s control, that ultimately erode 
companies’ margins and forces them to engage in processes of self-renewal. At the same time, 
vertical disintegration due to modularity poses equal challenges (and opportunities) in terms of 
business model re-configuration because knowledge and technology converge but the applications’ 
scenario is broader. 
74 
 
 
 
  
Figure 13. Phases of convergence (adapted from Hacklin, 2007) 
Hacklin (2007) offers a dynamic view of such convergence: according to his framework (see figure 
5) when (a) knowledge bases start to have common points and technologies converge, and (b) a 
commercial phase has not started yet, the existing mechanisms of value creation  start to get 
deconstructed: this may due to ineffective firm-level knowledge protection, although phenomena 
such as open innovation or selective revealing do occur (Chesbrough, 2003; Alexy et al., 2013), or 
to modularity, that erodes industries’ vertical structures (Baldwin and Clark, 1997), therefore way 
beyond firms’ control and allows forms of recombination into new business models driven by 
horizontal impetus between different vertical structures (see figure 14 and 15 with two value chains 
distinct and afterwards “blurring”). 
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Figure 14 – TLC and consumer computing value chains (from Hacklin, 2007) 
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Figure 15 Horizontal impetus between established value chains (adapted from Hacklin, 2007) 
The disintegration of existing verticals therefore makes the field highly unstable and entropic 
because companies have to re-configure viable value propositions into new value chains: some, 
especially what Hacklin defines “pioneering disruptors” (p.91), do seek to re-configure the value 
mechanisms through recombination of activities that belong to different verticals through, as said, 
horizontal impetus. In addition, un-validated value networks emerge over previous incumbent 
chains of value: Jacobides (2005) and Jacobides and Cacciatori (2005) have stressed the paradoxical  
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assertion that incumbent firms’ impetus occurs along deconstructed value chains: quoting Hacklin 
(2007), “although retainment of vertically integrated (structures) from firms’ perspectives are no 
longer viable solutions, and horizontal orientations of firms allow more complex, and distributed 
forms of value generation mechanisms to emerge, certain trends of verticalization on an industry 
level do however continue (p. 91, emphasis added)”. In other words, incumbents do tend to 
verticalize through hybrid and loose vertical structures, that is very different in terms of control and 
entrepreneurial vision in respect to re-integrate vertically. We clarify further this concept because it 
resembles many views of research that have stressed the traps encountered by incumbents trying to 
self-renew themselves during critical periods of margins’ erosion and change: thanks to modularity 
a product can be produced and exchanged efficiently in vertical structures that sometimes are very 
different one from the other (horizontal impetus); although endowed with more resources compared 
to small scale pioneers,  incumbents may find harder times because they have structures and 
organizing principles less malleable and more difficult to redeploy in such horizontal bridging 
because such leap requires to overcome inertia. What’s more viable and consistent with 
incumbents’ routines is the possibility that they re-frame the entropic situation by referring to the 
same vertical landscape they are used to operate and compete: sometimes this vertical impetus can 
be an effective and legitimate operation of refocus of the offering at a lower or upper layer of the 
vertical, leading to a platform strategy and avoiding the firm to get stuck in the industry bottleneck. 
78 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16– Disintegration of value generation into network (from Hacklin, 2007) 
To sum up, there are phases of knowledge and technology convergence that simply force companies 
to re-configure their value propositions in new fashions: in such phases horizontal and vertical 
impetus guiding companies’ reconfigurations have to consider that value chains become value 
networks (Stabell and Fjeldstadt, 1998) highly uncertain and entropic. This, in turn, leads to new 
forms of inter-firm interactions centered on pursuits of opportunities for re-configuration: formation 
of interest groups, consortia and lobbying activities toward standardization bodies happens in this 
phase, similarly to the context of inter-organizational collaboration and the interaction dynamics 
accounted in this study. 
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Consortia and interest groups 
It should appear clear now that such sudden explosion of inter-firm interactions can be channeled 
into a social structure that constitutes the terrain devoted to the proactive pursuit of competing 
interests under an overarching collaborative scope. In particular, we think that “special interest 
groups” and consortia between different companies and organizations constitute exactly the fuzzy 
though basic structures that companies use to manage their collective races for opportunities: 
according to Barringer and Harrison (2000) consortia are formed by “groups or organizations that 
have a similar need and band together to create a new entity to satisfy that need at all (p.389)” and 
“tend to group together a lot of different entities (p.389)”. Exactly because affected by a general 
disadvantage in terms of governance mechanisms, consortia may paradoxically result organizational 
structures more malleable and effective for driving competing interests and influence the 
overarching goal than, for example, trade associations, where governance issues are not so salient, 
or interlocking directorates where the cooptation occurs more on an exchange logic basis. In this 
sense, if it’s unclear how the different interests can result in a new configuration of value, the 
benefits of consortia are more driven by strategic considerations of flexibility in respect to those 
regarding economic value (Doz, Hamel, 1998): they present an interesting combination of clear 
external boundaries formalized through membership decisions and internal lack of social barriers 
for acquiring many types of knowledge. In other words they can be represented as clubs where, 
once granted access, individual companies may have great discretion in jockeying and political 
moves (Goffman, 1981). An example is given by the work of Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy 
(2002) on the sponsorship of Java as a common technological standard: the authors stress the co-
opetitional and structurationist nature of the process and the need for political and social skills in 
order to orchestrate the collective process of technology sponsorship. 
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Technological fields and coopetition 
We think that what considered so far is pertinent to many technological systems; a technological 
system is a set of components that interact with one another to provide utility to users (Garud, 
Garud and Jain, 1997). A key factor is to design compatibility among components in order to allow 
interoperability between different modules and in this sense the system architecture must be 
designed accordingly. But between the technological system and the whole field  there exists an 
institutional void that requires the establishment of rules or the replacement and modification of 
existing ones: indeed, rules govern the production and distribution of associated artifacts (Van de 
Ven and Garud, 1994) and shape technological fields (Garud, Garud and Jain, 1997). A key facet of 
such institutional space is therefore given by technological standards such as the interface 
specifications that establish the “rules of engagement” within the technological system. Common 
standards when successfully shaped can give competitive returns and particularly for products that 
present network externalities (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Barnett, 1990). 
Garud has talked about sponsorship of common technological standards in terms of institutional 
entrepreneurship at the level of the industry (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994): institutional entrepreneurship 
is given by one or more initiatives where a new system is tied together along with existing sets of 
institutions, that is “taken for granted aspects of life (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).” We take a less 
individualistic and heroic perspective in order to stress the interplay of meanings and interactions 
that emerge through a negotiated process in a technological field (Pinch and Bijker, 1987): at the 
same time we conceptually adopt Garud’s depiction of the technological field as containing the 
technological system. 
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This implies that race for opportunities are not only characterized by competing interests nested 
under an overarching scope that resembles the “umbrella strategy” described by Mintzberg and 
Waters (1985); they are also characterized by decision-making processes aiming to harness the 
coalescence of units around an issue in order to influence the decision accruing to the group. In 
industrial settings populated by economic agents such as companies and firms this is likely to occur 
when knowledge and technology convergence broadens the potential applicative scenarios: the 
entropic situation is due to the disintegration of existing value chains and the horizontal and vertical 
links between these that  managers and entrepreneurs will strive to establish in order to catch viable 
opportunities of re-configuration. The latency of such opportunities gives rise to collective actions 
of market molding such as interest groups, standard consortia and lobbies: these aim to give an 
enabling and at the same time constraining direction to the opportunity journey in order to make the 
possibility to compete in the market concrete for all travelers.  
We build on two related theoretical streams to suggest that companies will respond to opportunities 
through socially constructed structures for two reasons. First, sociological theories of reality as a 
social construction (Berger and Luckmann, 1968) point to the self-recursiveness of social life; 
people tend to act in social situations in ways that are not objective nor subjective but that are the 
externalization of the social reality previously internalized as an outcome of interpersonal 
interactions. This means that companies representatives will resemble the “inception reality” with 
the array of knowledge that mostly accrues to them, i.e. companies and administrative structures 
themselves: the more crowded are opportunities at their onset (rather than populated by few players) 
the more we consider this possibility valid. One-o-one relationships between companies are usually 
formalized through formulas going from licensing to strategic alliances, i.e. formal agreements; 
multi-party alliances are on the contrary formalized through consortia, and both alternatives are 
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forms of human organizing highly institutionalized and interiorized by managers; we suspect that in 
operations aimed to reduce the perceived uncertainty of the surrounding environment managers will 
rely upon such organizational formulas almost automatically. On the other side, we claim that such 
attitude is not completely conscious or meaningful but socially driven, highly voluntary and 
fundamentally opportunistic. In this sense, structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) suggests that social 
groups, from individuals to entire social systems, may exactly do this, i.e. enable and constrain 
action, therefore “guiding” social groups to carry on whatever the objective but conditional on the 
existence of an objective. In highly contested terrains of opportunities where competing interests are 
nested under the same overarching framework this might likely be the case. 
Both qualifications of how individuals seeking opportunities for their companies can react seems 
almost logical considering the emphasis of first ecosystem theories on collaboration: we take 
advantage of this subtle assessment to consider the adherence of innovation ecosystems to co-
opetitive strategies (Brandeburger and Nalebuff, 1996) and to avoid ambivalence on a such delicate 
issue. 
Indeed, the results of the study imply that such journey is not completely competitive nor 
collaborative: the topic of competition, collaboration and also coopetition has been scrutinized 
during the phase of theoretical sampling but its pure application to the research context  seemed 
useful though to a limited extent. This is not to say that the evidence of the study indicates that 
people or companies don’t compete for scarce resources or that competition doesn’t exist: instead, 
people and companies do compete and accounts of competition are at the heart of many game 
theoretic, economic and biological models. Nonetheless, competition and collaboration are not 
mutually exclusive but fundamentally co-existing in modern societies: the difference between them 
is that collaboration is a relational stance highly legitimate in social accounts of modern life 
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sophisticated enough, while competition is not. Instead, direct and forward competition within 
social groups is strongly sanctioned and kept marginalized and “suspended”; direct confrontation is 
more and more avoided in Western societies as individuals prefer to keep it latent, therefore under 
the table and out of sight (Elias, 1978). Companies are no exception in this perspective and what 
follows is that encounters between competing carriers of interest are administrated and pursued in 
isolated venues where the rules of the game are explicitly set to avoid direct confrontation and 
promote collaboration among those coming together. Such collaborative stance is a natural social 
refining of the individual life of Fellow Travelers whose primary way of dealing with others is 
related to a technology-product and the context around which such product is created and pushed. 
Equivalent to Elias’ account of how court life became a social code to access spaces inhabited by 
political elites (1978), the expertise of technologists is its updated version to rleate to a point of 
interest. Standards development organizations and regulatory bodies are the contemporary versions 
of the King’s court where bloodbaths are sanctoned. Another point of reformulation of Elias’ 
historic account is in the disintegration process of the previous generation of handset devices and, as 
a consequence, of the Alliance’s initiator: like a falling empire, the disintegration of the former 
giant left many technologists on their own, eager to re-deploy their capabilities and fundamentally 
looking for another point of coalescence shielded from competition. It is therefore simplistic and 
misleading to see the expertise capable to infleunce so dramatically processes of industrial creation 
as an excluding means for an elite to reinforce its power. The final part of the study is therefore 
aimed to offer a model of guided evolution where learning is key and the power relations center on 
soft power rather than hard. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The introductory part of this study asked what are the micro-dynamics of collaboration when the 
boundary between the collective goal and the individual interest is fuzzy and ill-defined: the 
individual and group level activities performed by co-creators were characterized by dynamics of 
collaboration highly political and centered on closing deals covering, first, the chase of co-creators 
toward their own company’s interest and, second and eventually, others’ wishes. The high 
ambiguity entailed by the covert nature of these deals seldom let the individuals involved make 
sense of what could become a meaningful activity for “the other”, therefore blocking a mindful 
choice of a recurrent activity capable to put at the same table different groups with a meaningful 
activity. The high rate of failure of those intiatives mostly geared to keep the fellowship unite and to 
embrace as many partners as possible strikes against the ability to co-create value performed in the 
experts’ gatherings. In the expert group, capable to influence the fate of the fellowship and guide 
the herd, the ambiguity toward the other appearently was not occurring; instead, it mantained high 
coordination and rate of average contribution among group participants although it resulted the only 
group or recurrent activity to change leader during the 13 months of field work. This indicates that 
what was at work in such group was not only a refinement of an architecture but also a high 
endowement of group coordination skills. Indeed, as long as the old boys work was performed in a 
well-known socio-professional circle (in-group activities) rather than the pure accomplishment of a 
task authoritatively prescribed by the formal hierarchy (such as the activities characterized by 
interactions with the external), it resulted working in a smooth and confortable fashion. This 
opposition between expertise and formal authority resembles Follett’s account elaborated by 
Dalhander and O’Mahony (2011): tracing the origin of the concept of horizontal authority in the 
late 20s, they notice that “when she (i. e. Follett) made the argument that authority should not 
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depend on one’s hierarchy of rank but where knowledge and expertise were closest- at the task level 
(2011, p. 962)”. The present research aims to strengthen this perspective through a field study that 
theorized on the political side of such dynamics and has a natural by-product in the implications in 
terms of power. The dynamics unveiled in the ILA story, such as the failure of Nokia’s intent and 
the progressive shift of control, reveals that a collective action, such as the evocation of an 
ecosystem of complementors, cannot be coordinated by using the mechanics of hard power 
traditionally associated with the enactment of leadership by large firms. Instead, means of the so-
called soft power (Nye, 2004; Kwak, Yoffie, HBR, 2006; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009) that 
resemble the concept of lateral authority were exercised by the emergent leading group and resulted 
much more effective in stimulating collaboration and interaction from the alliance members, at least 
compared to the authoritative style permeating Nokia’s temporary leadership. Finally, the majority 
of individuals representing small firms and startups limited their participation to an observing 
behavior and used the spaces created by the nestedness of so many interests to establish connections 
and configure potential value propositions with partners. The findings of the study support also a 
need for underemphasizing the role of the design of organizational structures in collaborative 
projects. Quoting Yoo, Boland and Lyytinen (2006), “By treating organization design as a choice 
among pre-existing alternatives, current organization design approaches lose the very idea of design 
as form giving. Yet, the future of our economy will be dependent on creating products and services 
that never existed before. It requires imagining a new world, designing artifacts to put into it, and 
inspiring others to follow (Yoo et al., 2006, p. 228).” 
An expert-based model of guided evolution 
The evidence extracted from the study and the analytical work performed on data allowed a 
thorough understanding about ecosystems and value networks: the capabilities of participants are 
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fundamental to make a project-based form of organizing advance. Such advancement occurs 
through adaptation with demands fueled by a process of learning enacted by the mechanisms 
described in the model below. The model is adapted from the model of guided evolution of Lovas 
and Ghoshal (2000) and depicts from left to right who are the elements sourcing the variation, i.e. 
potentially all members; such variation instantiates in initiatives at the group level and in the human 
and social capital possessed by individuals; the instantiations can materialize by virtue of the formal 
structure that the multi-party project can assume, in this case a special interest group; finally, the 
actors in charge of selecting which variations has to be retained or not, that is the old-boys club. 
Organizational change occurs through a drift of the organizational principle that takes the form of a 
ex-post rationalization in the eyes of participants whose answer to the question “what do we do, as 
an organization?” changes over time. Differently from accounts on sources of selection in strategy 
making (Canales, 2015), the evidence indicates that in settings with distributed leadership and 
participation is channeled through project work the learning process underlying the organizational 
adaptation is not sourced through constructive confrontation but through an expert-based attitude. 
This means not only that criteria are more stringent than those suggested by formulas wishing 
openness and democracy, but also that the power to influence the evolution of an ecosystem accrues 
to a very limited fellowship of experts. In this sense, the present research may contribute by 
constituting a potential bridge between the focus on initiatives and organizational adaptation of 
strategy making scholars, the interorganizational concerns of ecosystem conceptualizations and the 
construct of lateral authority as a form of power in project-based settings. 
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Figure 17. An expert-based model of guided evolution (adapted from Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000) 
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